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Abstract—Multisignature schemes are digital signature
schemes where a group of people signs a document in such a
way that the document signature is valid if and only if it is
determined by the signature of all and every single member of
the group. In this paper, some of the most important RSA-based
multisignature schemes are presented, along with their pros and
cons.
Index Terms—Digital signature, Multisignature, Public key
cryptography, RSA cryptosystem.
I. INTRODUCTION AND NOTATIONS
Digital signature schemes allow a user to sign a (normally
not secret) document by using a public key infrastructure
(PKI). In order to sign the document, the sender encrypts a
hash of the document by using his/her private key. Then, the
verifier uses the signer’s public key to decrypt the received
signature and to check if it matches the document hash. In case
of a confidential document, the protocol includes an additional
ciphering of the signature by the sender using the receiver’s
public key. The latter deciphers the received cryptogram by
using his/her own private key and performs the same protocol.
The keys to be used are derived from some underlying
asymmetric-key cryptosystem, such as RSA ([15]), ElGamal
([2]), based on elliptic curves ([6]), and so on. Actually, the
security of the signature scheme depends on the security of
the underlying asymmetric-key cryptosystem.
Often some modifications to the original scheme are re-
quired in order to cope with different needs. One of these
possible needs is the group signature. In this scheme, a group
of users signs a document in such a way that the signature is
deemed valid if and only if all and every single member of the
group signs the document and each signature can be correctly
verified. This scheme is known as a multisignature.
In this work, we present and compare several of the most
relevant multisignature schemes, all of them based on the RSA
cryptosystem. We also remark their pros and cons.
As a general comment, the security of the schemes de-
scribed in this work is related to the security of RSA (except
for those cases where the key generation process gets mod-
ified). However, each scheme would require a deep security
analysis by itself, which, for the lack of space, is beyond the
scope of the present work.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II includes a short
description of RSA cryptosystem and how to sign documents
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by means of this system. Section III presents the definition
and the main properties of the multisignature schemes. The
Itakura-Nakmura scheme, Okamoto scheme and Harn-Kiesler
scheme are analyzed in Sections IV, V, and VI, respectively.
In section VII other multisignature schemes are commented,
and finally the conclusions are included in section VIII.
II. RSA
RSA cryptosystem ([15]) consists of three phases: key
generation, encryption and decryption, as described below.
Key generation for a user 푈 is as follows:
1) Select two large prime numbers 푝, 푞 and computes 푛 =
푝 ⋅ 푞 and 휙(푛) = (푝− 1)(푞 − 1).
2) Select a positive integer 푒, 1 < 푒 < 휙(푛), such that
gcd(푒, 휙(푛)) = 1.
3) Compute the inverse of 푒 in ℤ∗휙(푛), 푑, so that 푒 ⋅ 푑 ≡ 1
mod 휙(푛).
The public key of 푈 is the pair (푛, 푒) and his/her private
key is 푑. For security reasons, the values 푝, 푞 and 휙(푛) must
be kept secret.
If Bob, 퐵, wishes to cipher the message, 푚, and send it to
Alice, 퐴, he carries out the following operations:
1) He obtains 퐴’s public key: (푛퐴, 푒퐴).
2) He represents 푚 as an integer in the range [0, 푛퐴 − 1],
even splitting 푚 into smaller blocks if necessary (that’s
called reblocking).
3) The ciphered message is 푐 = 푚푒퐴 mod 푛퐴.
To decipher the cryptogram 푐 and recover the original mes-
sage, 푚, Alice simply uses her private key 푑퐴 and computes
푐푑퐴 ≡ 푚푒퐴푑퐴 ≡ 푚 mod 푛퐴.
Asymmetric-key cryptosystems allow the sender to digitally
sign a message, so that the receiver can check that the message
is authentic and not modified.
Suppose that Alice, 퐴, wishes to digitally sign a document,
푚, and send it to Bob, 퐵. The steps are the following.
1) She determines the hash or digest of the document
by using a hash function ([3], [4], [11, Chapter 9]),
픥(푚) = 푚˜ and encrypts it using her private key:
푟 ≡ 푚˜푑퐴 mod 푛퐴.
2) She ciphers the value 푟 with Bob’s public key: 푠 ≡ 푟푒퐵
mod 푛퐵 . She ciphers also the document 푚, using also
Bob’s public key: 푐 = 푚푒퐵 mod 푛퐵 .
3) She sends the ciphered document 푐 to Bob, along with
its digital signature 푠.
Once the document and the signature are received by Bob
from Alice, he can perform the verification phase as follows:
1) He computes 푠푑퐵 mod 푛퐵 ≡ 푟푒퐵푑퐵 mod 푛퐵 ≡ 푟.
2) He determines 푟푒퐴 mod 푛퐴 ≡ 푚˜푑퐴푒퐴 mod 푛퐴 ≡ 푚˜.
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3) He deciphers 푐 to obtain 푚, and checks whether the
hash of 푚, 픥(푚), matches 푚˜. If it does, the signature
is valid.
If the document to be signed is public, then step 2) of the
signature and step 1) of the verification are not necessary. As a
collateral effect, any other user could also verify the signature
of 퐴, since both the document 푚 and the signature 푟 are
public.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume in this work that all
the multisignatures are carried out on public documents. In
case the document must be kept secret, the protocol must be
modified following the step described above.
The security of the encryption and decryption processes,
and the digital signature scheme based on RSA, depend on
the difficulty of solving the factorization problem, which at
present is considered computationally infeasible.
III. MULTISIGNATURE SCHEMES
Multisignature schemes are digital signature protocols
whereby a group of signers 퐺퐹 = {퐹1, 퐹2, . . . , 퐹푡}, signs
a given document in such a way that the signature is valid if
and only if all the members of the group participate in the
signature protocol.
Most of the multiple signature protocols based on public
key cryptosystems are performed in the following way:
1) The signer 퐹1 signs a digest of the original message,
calculated from a publicly-known hash function. This
signature is performed by using the signer private key
and following the protocol established by the public key
cryptosystem in use.
2) Next, each one of the following signers, in an ordered
fashion, signs the document, already signed by the
preceding member of the group, following the same
signature protocol.
3) Finally, the last member of the group of signers, 퐹푡,
signs the document relayed by the preceding member of
the group, and, optionally, also with the public key of the
verifier. Subsequently, 퐹푡, sends to the verifier not only
the message but also the multiple signature calculated
by the group of signers.
The verification procedure is performed as follows:
1) The verifier receives the message and the multiple sig-
nature calculated by the group of signers.
2) The verifier performs the verification of the multiple
signature by checking each one of the partial signatures
of the group of signers, following the protocol and
keeping the order in which they were signed.
However, this scheme is not efficient neither in terms of
computation time nor in terms of memory resources.
The rest of the article sections are devoted to review and
compare different existing multisignature schemes.
IV. ITAKURA AND NAKAMURA MULTISIGNATURE
Itakura and Nakamura ([8]) proposed the first known mul-
tisignature scheme. This scheme requires RSA key generation
process to be modified. In particular, the modulus 푛 should be
the product of three prime factors, and the third prime factor
should be public. The public knowledge of this factor does
not impair the system security as long as the other two factors
have been selected in a suitable manner.
In this scheme, a trusted third party is required, which
generates two large prime numbers, 푝, 푞, computes their
product 푛0 = 푝 ⋅ 푞, and 휙(푛0) = (푝 − 1)(푞 − 1); it also
computes a distinct prime factor 푟푖 for each of the signers 퐹푖
of the group 퐺, and a ciphering prime exponent 푒 < 휙(푛0),
verifying gcd(푒, 휙(푛0)) = 1 and 푒 > max{푟푖}1≤푖≤푡.
A. Key generation
Each signer 퐹푖 is assigned a public key (푛푖, 푒, 푟푖), with
푛푖 = 푛0 ⋅ 푟푖 = 푝 ⋅ 푞 ⋅ 푟푖, so that 푟푖 < 푟푗 for 1 ≤ 푖 < 푗 ≤ 푡;
in other words, 푛푖 < 푛푗 . Let 퐺 = {퐹1, 퐹2, . . . , 퐹푡} be the
group of signers, ordered according to increasing moduli. The
primes 푝 and 푞 must be kept secret from the signers in order
to avoid impersonation attacks.
The private key for 퐹푖 is 푑푖, with 푒 ⋅ 푑푖 ≡ 1 (mod 휙(푛푖)).
Should a verifier 푉 be needed (when the document must
be kept secret, for example), his/her public key would be
(푛푉 , 푒, 푟푉 ), with 푛푉 = 푛0 ⋅ 푟푉 y 푟푉 = 푟푡+1 > 푟푡, and his/her
private key would be 푑푉 , with 푒 ⋅ 푑푉 ≡ 1 mod 휙(푛푉 ).
B. Signing and verifying the multisignature
Let 푚˜ be the digest of the message 푚, computing by means
of a hash function. The signing process is carried out in
an ordered fashion (ascending order); each signer signs the
document relayed by the precedent member as follows:
1) 퐹1 computes the first partial signature, by computing
푠1 ≡ 푚˜푑1 mod 푛1 and relays it to 퐹2.
2) Next, each participant 푖 signs the document relayed to
him/her by the precedent participant, 푖 − 1, computing
푠푖 ≡ 푠푑푖푖−1 mod 푛푖, 2 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푡− 1.
3) The last signer, 퐹푡, determines the group signature by
simply signing the partial signature received from 퐹푡−1,
namely, computing 푠 = 푠푡 ≡ 푠푑푡푡−1 mod 푛푡.
If the message must be kept secret, 퐹푡 encrypts the group
signature 푠 using the verifier’s public key: 푆 ≡ 푠푒푡 mod 푛푉 .
The verification process is carried out also in a (descending)
ordered fashion.
1) Each partial multisignature is recovered by deciphering
it with each member’s public key, (푛푖, 푒). For each 푖,
푡 ≥ 푖 ≥ 1, 푠푖−1 ≡ 푠푒푖 mod 푛푖.
2) Eventually, 푠0 = 푠푒1 mod 푛1 is computed. The signa-
ture is correctly verified if and only if 푠0 = 푚˜.
If the message is secret, the first step of the verification
process must be the deciphering of 푆, performed by using the
verifier’s private key, 푑푉 , namely, 푆푑푉 ≡ 푠푒⋅푑푉푡 mod 푛푉 ≡
푠푡.
C. Properties
The bit length for the group signature in this scheme is
[푠] = [푚] + [푛] ⋅ 푡, where [푠] represents the bit length of 푠. For
example, if [푛] = 1024 bits, [푚] = 2000 bits and the number
of signers is 푡 = 10, then the bit length for the signature is
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2000 + 1024 ⋅ 10 = 12240, whereas it is just 2000 + 1024 =
3024 bits for the case of a simple signature.
If 푛 is a perfect pseudo-prime, which is unlikely but not
impossible, then the scheme has a weakness. The message
could be recovered without the actual knowledge of the private
key.
V. OKAMOTO MULTISIGNATURE
Okamoto ([12]) proposed a multisignature scheme that
uses bijective public key cryptosystems, such as RSA. An
asymmetric-key cryptosystem is considered bijective whenever
the corresponding encrypting, 픈, and decrypting, 픇, functions
are actually bijective.
The main improvements of Okamoto’s scheme with respect
to the one of Itakura and Nakamura are: (i) The length of the
multisignature is virtually the same as the length of the plain
signature; (ii) signing and verifying processes are efficient;
(iii) there is no restrictive ordering when signing; and (iv) the
scheme can be based on any bijective public key cryptosystem.
A. Key generation
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that for any signer
퐹푖 in 퐺, 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푡, 푀푖 is the corresponding plain and cipher
text space; (푛푖, 푒푖) and 푑푖 are the corresponding public and
private keys, and the encryption and decryption functions are,
respectively:
픈푒푖 ,픇푑푖 : 푀푖 → 푀푖,
픈푒푖(푚1) = 푚
푒푖
1 mod 푛푖,
픇푑푖(푚2) = 푚
푑푖
2 mod 푛푖,
so that
픈푒푖 ∘픇푑푖(푡푒푥푡) = 픇푑푖 ∘ 픈푒푖(푡푒푥푡) = 푡푒푥푡, 푡푒푥푡 ∈푀푖.
Without loss of generality, we assume that all the elements
in 푀푖, ∀푖, have the same length, which is [푙] = [푀푖] =
max{[푚] : 푚 ∈ 푀푖}, by simply padding on the left with the
bit ‘0’ when required. Remark also the following notation:
∙ {푆}퐿 denotes the [푆]−퐿 most significant bits of 푆, i.e.,
[{푆}퐿] = [푆]− 퐿.
∙ {푆}퐿 denotes the 퐿 less significant bits of 푆, i.e.,
[{푆}퐿] = 퐿.
∙ 퐿{푆} denotes 푆 padded con 퐿− [푆] bits on the left, i.e.,
[퐿{푆}] = 퐿.
∙ The operation × is the direct product of sets, whereas ∥
denotes concatenation.
Each signer 퐹푖 of 퐺, 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푡, has his/her own public key,
(푛푖, 푒푖), and private key, 푑푖, for the RSA cryptosystem. Be-
sides, the tuple {푀푖,픈푒푖 ,픇푑푖 , 픥푖} defines the multisignature
scheme, where 픥푖 is a safe hash function.
B. Signing and verifying a multisignature
Given a document, 푚, to sign, the multisigning process is
as follows:
1) 퐹1 creates a pair, the document and its signature, by
computing:
푚1 = 푚, 푠1 = 픇푑1(픥1(푚))
and sends 푚1∥푠1 along with his/her identifier, {퐼1} to
퐹2.
2) 퐹푖, 2 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푡, receives 푚푖−1∥푠푖−1 from 퐹푖−1 and
checks the correctness, namely, that 푚푖−1 is the message
whose signature is 푠푖−1. In order to do so, he/she uses
the equations (1)-(5).
3) If the signature is valid, 퐹푖 computes the next message
along with its signature as follows:
If [푀푖] > [푀푖−1], then
푚푖 = 푚푖−1, 푠푖 = 픇푑푖
(
[푀푖]{푠푖−1}
)
.
Otherwise, he/she computes
푚푖 = 푚푖−1∥{푠푖−1}[푀푖]−1,
푠푖 = 픇푑푖
(
[푀푖]
{{푠푖−1}[푀푖]−1}) .
4) 퐹푖 sends 푚푖∥푠푖 along with his/her identifier and that of
the previous signers, {퐼1, . . . , 퐼푖}, to 퐹푖+1.
5) 퐹푡 publishes the multisignature, which consists in the
pair 푚푡∥푠푡, along with the identifiers {퐼1, . . . , 퐼푡}.
The verifier considers that the order of signing is given
by the identifiers, {퐼1, . . . , 퐼푡}, and checks if message 푚푡
corresponds to the multisignature 푠푡 by using the public keys
푒푖, 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푡, as follows:
1) The values 푚′푖∥푠′푖 are given by the following equations,
setting initially 푚′푡 = 푚푡 and 푠
′
푡 = 푠푡.
If [푀푖−1] < [푀푖],
푚′푖−1 = 푚
′
푖, (1)
푠′푖−1 = {픈푒푖(푠′푖)}[푀푖−1]. (2)
Otherwise,
푚′푖−1 = {푚′푖}[푀푖−1]−[푀푖]+1, (3)
푠′푖−1 = {푚′푖}[푀푖−1]−[푀푖]+1∥{픈푒푖(푠′푖)}[푀푖]−1. (4)
2) The message with multisignature 푚푡∥푠푡 is considered
valid if the following equation holds:
픈푒1(푠
′
1) = 픥1(푚
′
1). (5)
C. Properties
The length of the multisignature in this scheme is virtually
the same as in the case of plain signature. In fact, if the size
of each 푛푖 is [푛푖] = 1024 bits, 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푡, then the size of the
multisignature, 푚푡∥푠푡, is
[푚푡∥푠푡] = [푚] + 1024 + 푡 = [푚1∥푠1] + 푡,
that is to say that the length of message 푡 along with its
multisignature is only 푡 bits longer than the message along its
plain signature. This is a remarkable difference with respect
to the scheme of Itakura and Nakamura.
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D. Variants of the multisignature scheme
In [12], Okamoto proposed three variants of his first mul-
tisignature scheme. Each variant was designed in order to
have distinct properties, thus improving several aspects of
the original scheme. The first variant shows the following
properties:
1) Generation and verification procedures of the multisig-
nature are much simpler than those of the original
version.
2) The increase in the signature size is only one bit when
[푀푖] > [푀푖−1], but it is [푀푖]−[푀푖−1] bits in the original
version.
3) There is a part of the message 푚 that cannot be directly
read.
As for the second variant, we have:
1) The signing and verification of the multisignature are
easier than in the original version.
2) The signature length is larger than in the first variant
due to a certain constant.
3) The message 푚 can be directly read.
Last, there is a third variant, where the signature size can
be smaller than in the previous versions.
VI. MULTISIGNATURE OF HARN AND KIESLER
The scheme of Harn and Kiesler ([5]) was proposed in 1989
and allows a group of users to sign a document and send it in a
secret manner to a known-in-advance verifier. This is achieved
through a modification of RSA.
This protocol requires a trusted third party who determines
the order of signing as follows: signer 퐹푖 precedes signer 퐹푗
whenever 푛푖 < 푛푗 .
A. Key generation
Each signer, 퐹푖, 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푡, computes his/her keys as
follows:
1) Randomly selects two pairs of big primes: (푝푖, 푞푖) and
(푝¯푖, 푞¯푖). The first pair is used for the multisignature;
the second pair for ciphering the messages, in order to
achieve confidentiality.
2) Computes 푛푖 = 푝푖 ⋅푞푖 and 푛¯푖 = 푝¯푖 ⋅푞¯푖, with 푛푖 < ℎ < 푛¯푖,
for a publicly-known threshold value ℎ.
3) Computes the pairs (푒푖, 푑푖) and (푒¯푖, 푑¯푖), so that:
푒푖 ⋅ 푑푖 ≡ 1 mod 휙(푛푖), 푒¯푖 ⋅ 푑¯푖 ≡ 1 mod 휙(푛¯푖).
4) The public key is the tuple (푛푖, 푒푖, 푒¯푖). The other values
make up the private key, namely, (푝푖, 푞푖, 푝¯푖, 푞¯푖, 푑푖, 푑¯푖).
B. Signature and verification processes
We assume that there exists a channel for encryption and
decryption, though we will describe only the multisignature
process. We assume, further, that the group of 푡 signers is
ordered, i.e., the expression 푛1 < 푛2 < . . . < 푛푡 holds.
The multisignature of the original message digest 푚 is
carried out as follows:
1) The third party computes 푐1 ≡ 푚푒1 mod 푛1 and
sends 푐1 to 퐹1, along with the order of the signers,
({퐹1, . . . , 퐹푡}, 푐1).
2) 퐹1 recovers message digest, 푚, from 푐1 and from his/her
private key, 푑1:
푐푑11 ≡ 푚푒1⋅푑1 mod 푛1 ≡ 푚 mod 푛1.
Next, 퐹1 verifies whether the digest of the original
message (obtained via the encryption/decryption chan-
nel) matches the message digest recovered above. If it
does, he/she signs the message digest and encrypts the
signature using the public key of 퐹2:
푠1 ≡ 푚푑1 mod 푛1, 푐2 ≡ 푠푒21 mod 푛2.
퐹1 sends the tuple ({퐹1, . . . , 퐹푡}, 푐2) to 퐹2.
3) 퐹푖, 2 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푡, decrypts the signature of 퐹푖−1, 푠푖−1,
from 푐푖 and his/her private key 푑푖:
푐푑푖푖 ≡ 푠푒푖⋅푑푖푖−1 mod 푛푖 ≡ 푠푖−1 mod 푛푖.
Then, he/she obtains the digest of the original message
just by iteratively applying the decryption process to
every preceding signature:
푠
푒푖−1
푖−1 ≡ 푠푖−2 mod 푛푖−1, (6)
. . .
푠푒22 ≡ 푠1 mod 푛2, (7)
푠푒11 ≡ 푚 mod 푛1. (8)
If 퐹푖 agrees to sign the message, he/she signs 퐹푖−1 to
obtain 푠푖 ≡ 푠푑푖푖−1 mod 푛푖.
Next, he/she ciphers the newly-computed signature by
using the public key of 퐹푖+1, to whom it is sent, along
with the ordering of signers:
푐푖+1 ≡ 푠푒푖+1푖 mod 푛푖+1.
4) Last, 퐹푚 executes the previous-explained step, but in
his/her case, considering that 퐹푚+1 is the verifier. Once
the signature 푠푡 is computed, he/she encrypts it with the
public key of the verifier 푉 , and sends it to him/her. In
this way, only 푉 is able to perform the verification of
the message:
푠 ≡ 푠푒¯푉푡 mod 푛¯푉 ,
where (푛¯푉 , 푒¯푉 ) is the public key of the verifier encryp-
tion/decryption channel. The following must be true for
the modulus of this public key: 푛1 < 푛2 < . . . < 푛푡 <
푛¯푉 .
The verifier of the multisignature, 푉 , verifies it as follows:
1) 푉 obtains the original message via the encryp-
tion/decryption channel by deciphering.
2) 푉 decrypts the received multisignature by means of
his/her private key, 푑¯푉 , thus obtaining the signature 푠푡,
which was computed previously by using the private key
of each of the signers.
푠푑¯푉 ≡ 푠푒¯푉 ⋅푑¯푉푡 mod 푛¯푉 ≡ 푠푡.
3) 푉 recovers the digest of the original message, 푚, 푠푡,
and the partial signatures, 푠푖, 푡− 1 ≥ 푖 ≥ 1, by simply
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decrypting in an ordered fashion and using the public
keys of the signers, according to equations (6)-(8).
4) Last, 푉 checks whether the recovered message digest
matches the digest that can be computed from the
message transmitted through the encryption/decryption
channel.
C. Properties
This scheme presents two drawbacks, which render it rather
useless for real applications.
1) The key generation process is centralized: this can be
unfeasible for networks with many users.
2) In practice, there is no hierarchy amongst the users of a
network.
3) The moduli must be ordered, which is also inconvenient
in practice.
As a clear advantage, the multisignature size is constant
and independent of the number of signers participating in the
protocol.
VII. OTHER MULTISIGNATURE SCHEMES
Let us summarize the problems and limitations we have
found so far and the solutions that can improve the efficiency
of the proposed multisignature scheme:
a) There can be a bit expansion when the message is
blocked: if the modulus is 푛, and the block size is 푘
bits, then larger messages must be split into at most
(푘 − 1)-bit blocks. Since the corresponding ciphertext
could potentially have up to 푘 bits, then we have a
possible expansion of 1 bit per ciphered block.
b) There is a potential conflict due to the modulus size
(called ‘reblocking problem’). Since each signer has a
different public key, it should not be expected that the
signature 푠퐴 of signer 퐴 be less than the modulus 푛퐵
of the second signer, 퐵. This problem tends to explode,
as the number of signer grows. Harn and Kaisler (see
§VII-A) presented a solution requiring that the signers
sign in the order imposed by their respective moduli.
c) Another potential conflict arises in the modulus used for
the digital signature and for confidentiality (it is really
a particular case of the previous case) if two users want
to sign a document. This case was already dealt with in
the original RSA article ([15]) and occurs when a user
퐴 wants both to sign a message and to send it encrypted
to user 퐵. To this end, both the private key of 퐴 and the
public key of 퐵 must be used. In the same reference, the
authors proposed a solution for this problem, whereby
each user has a pair (푒, 푛) such that ℎ < 푛 < 2ℎ, ℎ being
a certain threshold value. Any message must be codified
as a number less that ℎ and is ciphered in a standard
RSA way. If the ciphertext happens to be greater that
ℎ, then it is iteratively re-ciphered until the ciphertext
becomes less than ℎ. To decipher, the same procedure
is followed, but reversed: the deciphering is iteratively
applied until a value less than ℎ is obtained: that is the
recovered plaintext.
The following signature schemes try to solve this type of
problems.
A. Kiesler and Harn schemes
Harn-Kiesler ([5]) and Kiesler-Harn ([9]) proposed mul-
tisignature schemes that intended to avoid some of the prob-
lems derived from modulus expansion (see [9], [10]). This
problem appears when iteratively ciphering a plaintext, since
the corresponding ciphertext can have 1 more bit than the
plaintext it comes from. This mandates to split the ciphertext
into smaller blocks when it must reciphered (as it is the case
in multisignature schemes). These authors propose that all the
signers select an equal sized modulus (say 푘 bits long), and so
both the message blocks and the signatures would be restricted
to a maximum value of (푘 − 1) bits.
An advantage of the scheme suggested by Kiesler and
Harn is that there is no predefined order in the signing
process. However, an important drawback comes from its
high computational load, which renders it useless in practical
networks.
B. Park, Park, Kim, and Won scheme
Park, Park, Kim, and Won ([13]) proposed in 1997 two
schemes that improve other previous proposals. There is no
predefined signing order and the efficiency is better. However,
the first proposed scheme increases the multisignature number
of bits, though bounded by the number of signers. The second
one, in its turn, has not that problem but demands that the
moduli of all the signers have the same number of bits and
part of the most significant ones must be shared by all; clearly,
this does not add any advantage to the security of the system.
C. Pon, Lu, and Lee scheme
In 2002, Pon, Lu, and Lee ([14]) used the so-called
‘dynamic reblocking’ to improve these schemes. The one
proposed by them saves modular exponentiations, avoids the
problem of ordering the signers, and minimizes the require-
ments imposed on the keys. For these reasons it is very suitable
for communication networks.
Key generation in Pon, Lu, and Lee scheme is as follows.
1) Each signer, 퐹푖, selects two large primes, 푝푖 and 푞푖, so
that 푛푖 = 푝푖푞푖, and 2푘−1 < 푛푖 < 2푘, where 푘 is the
number of bits of the modulus.
2) Signer’s private key, 푑푖, is selected under the condition
that gcd(푑푖, 휙(2푡푛푖)) = 1, 푡 being the maximum number
of possible signers.
3) Next, 퐹푖 computes his/her public key, 푒푖, such that 푒푖 ⋅
푑푖 ≡ 1 mod 휙(2푡푛푖).
4) Last, each user sends the pair (푛푖, 푒푖) to the system
directory of keys.
In the following, to simplify the notation, [푚] = 2푚 + 1
and ⟨푚⟩ = (푚 − 1)/2, where 푚 is the digest of the original
message, computed by means of a safe hash function.
Signer 퐹푖 generates his/her signature 푠푖 using the signature
of 퐹푖−1, 푠푖−1, by computing 푠푖 = 푠푑푖푖−1 mod 2
푖푛푖, where
푠0 = [푚] represents the digest of the original message.
The next signer (according to the dynamic order set up for
the group of signers) uses all the public keys of the precedent
signers in order to decrypt the multisignature in reverse order.
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For example, the signature of 퐹푖 can be verified as 푠푖−1 ≡ 푠푒푖푖
mod 2푖푛푖.
Last, each user can check whether the digest of the original
document 푚 = ⟨푠0⟩ is correct or not.
If the message must be kept secret, each signer encrypts
his/her signature using the public key of the next signer, and
then, sends to him/her both the signature and the computed
ciphertext.
D. Horng scheme
In 2006, Horng ([7]) presented a multisignature scheme
which solved the ‘reblocking problem’ and did not require
a predefined signature order.
The solution proposed by Horng for the ‘reblocking prob-
lem’ is to increase the value of the smaller modulus. Suppose,
for instance, that (푛퐴, 푒퐴) is the public key of user 퐴, and
(푛퐵 , 푒퐵) is the public key of user 퐵, and suppose further
that 푛퐴 > 푛퐵 . The ‘reblocking problem’ can be solved if we
permit that 푛퐵 is incremented while the public exponent, 푒퐵
remains constant. A simple implementation could be multiply
푛퐵 with 2ℓ, where ℓ is such that 2ℓ−1푛퐵 < 2푛퐴 < 2ℓ푛퐵 .
The modified system works correctly as long as the initial
message is odd. To achieve this, it suffices to add a ‘1’ bit
to the end of the message, with the result that the final size
has two more bits that the solution of Kohnfelder’s ([10]).
However, two more bits is not important, since key sizes are
at least 1024 bits.
E. Aboud scheme
Aboud ([1]) proposed in 2007 two new signature schemes
with the help of a trusted third party. We describe here the
second one, which permits more than two signers, and an
enhancement.
Let 퐺 = {퐹1, . . . , 퐹푡} be the group of signers. The trusted
third party selects a modulus 푛, which is the product of two
large primes, and assigns each signer, 푖, a private key, 푑푖. Next,
it computes the public exponent 푒 as follows:
(푑1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 푑푡)푒 ≡ 1 mod 휙(푛).
If 푚 is the digest of the original message, each signer
determines the signature by computing 푠푖 = 푚푑푖 mod 푛,
and sends it to the trusted third party. When all the partial
signatures are available, the trusted third party generates the
multisignature by multiplication, 푠 = (푠1 ⋅ 푠2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 푠푡) mod 푛.
It is clear that any user can verify the multisignature, by
simply using the public exponent 푒 and computing:
푠푒 mod 푛 = (푠1 ⋅ 푠2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 푠푡)푒 mod 푛
= 푚(푑1+⋅⋅⋅+푑푡)푒 mod 푛 = 푚.
In the same reference, the author also presents a modifica-
tion of this scheme that allows the signature of the document
by any two signers of the group, as follows. Suppose the third
party selects 푛 and 푑1, . . . , 푑푡, and a public exponent 푒, in
such a way that (푑1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 푑푡)푒 ≡ 1 mod 휙(푛).
Each user of the system receives all the private keys but
his/hers, i.e., the 푗-th user knows 푑1, . . . , 푑푗−1, 푑푗+1, . . . , 푑푡.
Now if user 푎 wants to sign a message along with user 푏,
he/she computes
푟푎 = 푑1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 푑푎−1 ⋅ 푑푎+1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 푑푡 mod 푛.
To sign a message digest, 푚, he/she computes 푠1 = 푚푟푎
mod 푛, and sends 푠1 to 푏, along with his/her identity 푎. Signer
푏 does have 푑푎, and so he/she is able to compute:
푠 = 푠2 = 푠1
푑푎 mod 푛.
Anyone is able to check the signature 푠 since trivially the
expression 푠푒2 ≡ 푚 mod 푛 holds.
Note that the order of signing is not important and the pair
of users (푎, 푏) has no special requirement, i.e., any pair of
members of the group can perform the protocol.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The protocols described above usually presents some defi-
ciencies. The most important ones are the following:
∙ It has been already attested that many of the proposed
schemes are insecure.
∙ They involve a great computational effort.
∙ In most of the multisignature schemes, the signature size
of a message grows as the group of signers does, which
is not desirable at all.
∙ The requirement that all signers must be present simul-
taneously to carry out the signature procedure can cause
a delay in obtaining the multisignature.
∙ The fact that the multisignature has to be carried out in
a determined order of the group of users forces to verify
each signer’s signature following the inverse order.
∙ Given a group of signers and a multisignature for a given
message, the multisignature protocol must be performed
once again by all the members of the group each time
one new signer joins the group.
∙ In several multisignature schemes some additional condi-
tions, more restrictive on the signer’s keys, are necessary.
In these schemes, the RSA modulus of each signer
must grow as the order of each of the signer does.
Otherwise, either the signature cannot be performed or
it must be divided into blocks and then each one of these
blocks must be signed. The fact of signing several blocks
involves a larger rise in the size of the signature and it
implicates more computational effort.
These reasons make clearly apparent the necessity of a
deep study in order to design new more efficient RSA-based
multisignature schemes, and to introduce new schemes based
on other difficult problems, such as the subgroup discrete
logarithm problem.
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